CONFLICTS IN SUDAN

A Paper Presented by

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At the Meeting of the Committee on Peace and Conflict Resolution of the Association of Senates, Shoora and Equivalent Councils in Africa and the Arab World (ASSECAA)

National Assembly Abuja, Nigeria

11 – 13 December 2007
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INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND (REMOTE CAUSES)

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, encompassing one million square miles and twenty-seven million people. Sudan's farthest boundaries straddle Africa's two cultural regions: the Islamic north and the Christian south. Within Sudan's borders are Africa's vast geographic regions: rain forest, savannah, steppe, and desert. More than 400 different languages and dialects are spoken among Sudan's 597 ethnic groups. In addition to the two major religious groupings, Islam and Christianity, the Sudanese people practice a variety of traditional indigenous African religions.

According to the International Crisis Group, the nationalist movement in Sudan in the 1940s brought about the emergence of two major northern political parties which excluded any voice the southern people might have in determining their future. Both parties played into the power struggle between Egyptian and British interests. One of the two parties, the Umma Party representing the Mahdi sect, demanded independence from Egypt. The other party, the National Unionist Party, had the support of al-Mirghani, head of another powerful Muslim sect, and called for a union between Egypt and Sudan. It was clear that the Arab north had no intention of sharing power with the African south.

Sudan is one of the most volatile areas on earth and has been at war since independence in 1955. These wars and open conflicts, are caused by the lack of development due to historic marginalisation. Sudan has been ruled since independence from Khartoum by a small group of predominantly Arab/Muslim elite hailing principally from the Nile River valley in central Sudan. As reported recently by the BBC, rather than working to develop Sudan's economy, empower people in the other parts of the country, these elites have "hoarded wealth and power for themselves". Successive governments in Khartoum have either ignored the peripheries or sought to suppress them militarily. As a result, Southern Sudan (and Darfur in the West) are the most war-torn, poorest and underdeveloped of the country and the world at large. These conflicts have left more than 1.5 million people dead, several millions displaced and made refugees as well the
environmental degradation of the region one of the most serious concern of the international community.

This paper is in two broad sections. The first will deal with conflicts in Southern Sudan, while the second will examine the conflict in Darfur.

CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN SUDAN: IMMEDIATE CAUSES

Southern Sudan is a region made up of 10 provinces. It shares borders with Ethiopia on the east, Kenya, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the south, and the Central Africa Republic to the west. To the north lies the predominantly Arab and Muslim region directly under the control of the central government. Southern Sudan is known also as the New Sudan and has an area of 589,745 km² and a population of 11 million. The capital is Juba as well as its largest city.

According to Dr Samson Wassara, the tribes of Southern Sudan fall under the following ethnic groups; Nilotics, Nilo-hamites, Bantu and Sudanese ethnic groups. The main tribes of the Nilotic ethnic group are Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk. While the main tribes of the Nilo-hamites ethnic group are the Murle, Toposa, Mundari and the Bari. Bantu and Sudanese ethnic groups consist of main tribal groups such as the Azande in Western Equatorial and the Fertit tribes in Western Bahr el Ghazal. The latter are mostly indigenous traditionalists and Christians. The region has over 400 dialects and the distinctive Juba Arabic language is a widely used lingua franca in Southern Sudan. However, English is the official language for education and government business.

Southern part of the country has experienced protracted conflicts, instabilities and corresponding loss of lives. The conflicts in Southern Sudan result from historical, political, social, cultural and administrative factors. The conflicts are of two folds: civil wars between the north and the south and inter communal conflicts.

CIVIL WARS (NORTH VERSUS SOUTH)
Civil war between the north and south broke out in 1955 and continued after Sudan became an independent nation in 1956. Sudan's succession of northern governments could not bring the conflict under control. Fighting continued until 1972, when the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) signed a peace agreement with the government of General Nimery. The peace was doomed from the start, because the foundation necessary for a pluralistic, democratic society was not there. Policies forcing the south to adopt Arab culture, Arab language, and the religion of Islam only intensified as Nimery strengthened Sudan's ties to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the 1970s, the sorry consequences of her grandiose economic development schemes made Sudan to drift away from the Soviet Union to the orbit of Western nations. In the meantime, internal unrest over bad economic policies was growing. When reserves of strategic minerals and petroleum were discovered in the south, Nimery's government thought it had found the solution to Sudan's troubles. But before he could exploit these new sources of wealth, Nimery somehow had to get the country back under control. By the early 1980s, strikes, riots, and shortages of goods and services had paralyzed the nation. In order to rally support from the northern parties, President Nimery announced on September 8, 1983 that Sudan's civil laws had been revised to bring them into conformity with Sharia, or Islamic Law.

While Sudan's recent history is a complex web of conflict, one thing stands out: the union of religion and identity has shaped the course of Sudan's institutions, international relations, and internal problems. For the Sudanese, to be Muslim is to be Arab. The most serious consequence of the 1984 imposition of Sharia law is that it transformed the civil war into a jihad, throwing the full weight of northern religious passion and identity behind the political struggle to keep the people and resources of the south under tight northern control.

The declaration of the so-called September Laws accompanied serious violations of the 1972 peace agreement with the SSLM. The government in Khartoum clearly intended to exploit the south's natural resources at any cost. Civil war broke out again. The southern forces, backed this time by the Soviet Union's surrogate in Ethiopia, had
reorganized in 1983 as the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). This civil war took on a religious dimension that had not characterized the previous struggle.

In 1986, a coup d'état forced Nimeiry out of power. The coalition government of northern political parties that replaced him was, in turn, overthrown in 1989 by General Omar al-Bashir and the charismatic fundamentalist leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), Hasan al-Turabi. The NIF outlawed all other political parties and transformed Sudan into an Islamic dictatorship. In response, the northern parties formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which included the SPLA. Peace talks between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan continually stumbled over the south's right to self-determination and over the relationship between state and religion.

INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICTS

Inter-communal conflicts which have been heightened by the civil wars is caused by the heterogeneity of the region and the attendant competition for political and economic advantages. For example, the dominance of the political arena which the Dinkas have been having under the late Dr. John Garang de Mabior has continued with the current President of the South, General Salva Kiir Mayardit. Given the diversity of Southern Sudan, this has created tensions. In addition, the oil and other mineral wealth of the South lie in the Unity and Upper Nile States which are predominantly inhabited by the Nuers who are underrepresented in the Government of Southern Sudan just as the South itself was marginalized by the central government in Khartoum.

Internal conflicts in southern Sudan are triggered by issues regarding ownership and use of fast depleting natural resources, (land for shelter, grazing, cultivation and water specifically), uneasy social relationship particularly between armed groups and diverse identities (ethnic, cultural and linguistic), anxiety, prejudice, fear, stress, uncertainties, availability and access to small arms and light weapons and the collapse of traditional authority and conflict resolution mechanisms.

This condition contributed largely to the splitting of the SPLA in 1991. The south was virtually destroyed by the in-fighting that followed the split, but the SPLA survived.
International intervention enabled both the armed resistance to the north and the peace talks to continue. By 1994, a significant grassroots peace movement began to emerge in the south. In 1996, several southern rebel factions signed a peace charter with the Government of Sudan. That charter, though never approved by the SPLA, became the basis for subsequent peace talks. A breakthrough in the peace process came in April 1997, when the Government of Sudan agreed to allow a referendum on self-determination for the south. The referendum will give the southern people the option of either unity or independence.

THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (CPA)

A comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005 between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudanese Central Government. The Agreement which at best can be described as power and wealth sharing deal, is intended to pave the way for elections by 2009 and to give the South the right to decide whether to split from the North by 2011. Other key agreements include boundary demarcation along side sharing of oil wealth and civil service positions particularly in Khartoum, and redeployment of the northern troops from the South. In order to drive all this to destination, a government of National Unity was put in place with a Southerner as the 1st Vice-President with a military of 39000 men from both sides.

Even before the first 1st Vice President John Garang died, there were problems of compliance with the provisions of the peace agreement. According to the International Crisis Group Africa Report No96 of 25 July 2005, the main obstacles were the old regime’s lack of will to embrace genuine power sharing and elections, and ultimately allow a southern self-determination referendum after the six-year interim period and lack of capacity in the South to establish and empower basic structures of governance. To keep the accords on track, the international community must focus on broadening participation and transparency, particularly handling of oil revenues, promote SPLM dialogue with the government-allied militias and quickly deploy the UN peace support mission, whose monitoring operations will be key to breaking the links between Khartoum and those southern proxies.
The peace deal poses a real threat to many groups associated with the National Congress Party (NCP) regime, which signed the CPA under some duress both to deflect international pressure over Darfur and to strengthen its domestic power base by securing a partnership with the SPLM. Most members recognise that free and fair elections required in 2009 would likely remove them from power. Many also fear that the self-determination referendum will produce an independent South, thus costing Khartoum much of its oil and other mineral wealth. There are signs the NCP seeks to undercut implementation through its use of the militias (the South Sudan Defence Forces, SSDF), bribery, and through the tactics of divide and rule. It actively encourages hostility between southern groups, with the hope that intra-south fighting will prove sufficiently destabilising that the referendum can be postponed indefinitely. These tactics will likely intensify if pressure over Darfur diminishes.

If the SPLM is to do its part in preventing an eventual breakdown of the CPA and return to war, it must make fundamental shifts in the way it operates. It has struggled, however, in its transition from a rebel movement to a political party, indeed to the point that its lack of inclusiveness and transparent decision-making has mirrored in some ways its long-time foe’s approach to governance. It is far behind its timetable for converting its guerrillas into a new army and has made little progress in creating institutional structures of governance and changing overly centralised methods of taking decisions and weaknesses that have been compounded by lack of money. There is growing frustration as early expectations of the peace have not been met.

The SPLM leadership must begin to democratise its movement and empower the nascent civil institutions of the new Government of Southern Sudan. The South-South Dialogue with southern political opposition groups launched in Nairobi in April was a positive step, but the late June negotiations with the SSDF fell short of an agreement. The recently concluded National Constitutional Review Commission failed to bring in most of the main northern opposition parties -- they boycotted it as rigged in favour of the NCP and the SPLM -- as well as the armed groups from the east and west.
Recent deals which the SPLM signed to develop oil concessions in the South violate the CPA and have generated considerable criticism both from the government and within the SPLM itself, and should be scrapped. Given that Khartoum's approach to oil has long been even more problematic, it is urgent to create the National Petroleum Commission called for in the CPA's Wealth Sharing Agreement so it can review all contracts signed in the past year. The CPA has no mechanism, however, for rapidly resolving disputes that have arisen over North-South boundaries in the oil areas and this would at least delay disbursement of oil revenue the Government of Southern Sudan vitally needs to meet its CPA commitments.

Recently, the Southern Sudan rebels have suspended their involvement in the national unity government saying the CPA has been violated in several ways over the last few weeks. Important deadlines have been missed including boundary demarcation, redeployment of northern troops and the fate of the disputed oil-rich state of Abiyé. The SPLM made known that the north National Congress Party had disregarded the wishes of SPLM leader, successor of John Garang, Vice President Salva Kiir, saying “They are not consulting Mr. Kiir, ... our ministers, they are taking many decisions including expelling the representatives of the UN Secretary General and different diplomats in Khartoum without taking the opinion of SPLM into consideration, the SPLM is also unhappy that our request to reshuffle our ministers in the coalition government has been ignored.” US envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios said there was a “real possibility of a return to conflict, one thing we are worried about, is that the senior political leadership in the North and in the South both maintain control over their field commanders which highlights the fragility of the current peace deal.

WAY FORWARD

The way forward may have been provided by the Vice President Kiir when he warned on November 7, 2007 that “a collapse of the peace deal would ripple regionally and beyond by fostering instability and extremism” and therefore preferred maintaining current political partnership with the ruling NPC despite the withdrawal of his ministers from the national government. But what will be the nature of the partnership? Will it be
the partnership of the tiger and the goat in which one is food for the other or the partnership of co-travelers in progress?

Christians of different churches and traditions gathered in Juba for an ecumenical prayer for peace on Sunday, 11 Nov 2007. According to Catholic Information Service for Africa (Nairobi) 13 November 2007, the facilitator of the Sudan Council of Churches, Tiberius Lecca, said in the welcoming speech that during the war the churches used to gather together every two or three months to pray for peace. "During the peace we have taken a long time without the ecumenical prayers", Lecca lamented. "There are things that are not alright in our country. Let us present them to God that he may help us," he added. The Catholic Archbishop of Juba, Paolino Lukudu Loro who delivered the sermon said "Now we need to rebuild this peace. It seems we have not prayed enough. We need to encourage our communities, our different groups and our parishes and our churches really to pray for peace; to pray for the CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the war in 2005]; to pray for the Sudan so that we have that necessary peace."

Despite the recourse to divine intervention, certain physical actions need to be taken if the current impasse must be overcome. These come by way of recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLVING THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT

a. There should be enhanced coordination of activities between UN agencies, African continental organisations, AU, ADB and regional economic organisations.

b. Quick impact projects in social sectors of health, shelter, water, food, road and special support to IDP’s and returnees.

c. More critically, urgent and concerted efforts need to be taken to address the widespread and rapidly increasing environmental degradation (land degradation, desertification and spread of deserts are most serious concerns). Investing in management and rehabilitation of natural resources is central to conflict resolution and peace building.
d. Persuade China to comply with arms embargo and support peace keeping missions in Sudan.

e. Pay urgent attention to local governance and conflicts challenges:-
Codification of customary laws through examination, harmonisation and conformation with the modern constitutional and administrative and legal system.

f. Take great advantage of the Southern Sudan Donor consortium Meeting scheduled to hold the first quarter of 2008 to mobilise resources for a holistic recovery and reconstruction of the region.

THE CONFLICT AND AFRICAN UNION MISSION OPERATIONS IN DARFUR

In June 2004, the African Union commenced a peace support operation in Darfur, Sudan. The aim of the operation was to assist in providing an environment that would facilitate a peaceful resolution of the conflict ravaging the region. Before discussing the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), I will like to introduce the region to you and give you the background to the conflict.

The Darfur region forms what is known as Western Sudan and covers an estimated area of 256,000 square Kilometres. It is bordered to the North by Libya, to the West by Chad and to South West by the Central African Republic. The eastern and the southern parts of Darfur are bordered respectively by the Sudanese regions of Kordofan and Bahr El-Gazal. The region has a dense population of 5.4 million people of various ethnicities. Prominent among these ethnic groups are the Zaghawa who are non-Arab camel nomads and inhabit the northernmost zone which is part of the Libyan Sahara. The area also has other minority ethnic groups. The eastern and southern zones of Darfur are populated by Arab sub clans (the Rezeigat, Habbaniya, Beni and Halba) who are cattle herders. The central area of the region is mainly inhabited by the Furs from which the region got its name—Darfur- Land of the Fur.
The people of Darfur are mostly farmers and animal herders who depend on the same arid environment for natural resources. The scramble for these limited natural resources, non-recognition of the collective grazing rights of the people, coupled with ecological problems of drought and desertification, led to innumerable inter-ethnic conflicts. Added to all these are the problems of political marginalisation and lack of socio-economic development which has been entrenched in the region over the years. These factors escalated the violence which already existed among the different ethnic groups producing the catastrophic humanitarian problems which the world has been witnessing in Darfur since 2003.

BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS IN DAFUR

The ongoing conflict in Darfur has its roots in both remote and immediate causes. The remote cause can be traced to independence in 1956, when power was bequeathed to a small Sudanese group of Arab elites in the Khartoum area to the detriment of the larger ethnic groups in the country. This sowed the seeds of racial discrimination, politics of exclusion and exploitation and the institution of policies which undermined the rights and privileges of the people.

In 1966, the Darfurians formed the Darfur Development Movement and started an organised struggle to redress the deep-rooted political and economic marginalization of the region by successive Sudanese government since independence. The situation was compounded in 1984 when Arab herdsmen were forced by near-famine condition caused by drought to migrate southwards in search of water and pasture for their animals. These migrations usually cause clashes between the migrating Arab nomads and non-Arab farming communities and have been partly responsible for the
violence which has continued to linger with varying degrees of intensity for the past four decades.

The immediate causes of the current conflict can be traced to an attack by the Arabs on a Zaghawa camp in Bir Tawill in late 2001 and the rape of a local Fur woman by a policeman in the town of Tur which caused deep resentment and led to serious riot. The Government assured the aggrieved people that measures would be taken to redress the situation but failed. This failure resulted in subsequent reprisal attacks against the government whose attention, at that time, was directed more on Southern Sudan where it was struggling to get a peace agreement with the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). Finally by the middle of 2002, the Sudanese Government and SPLM/A signed a peace agreement.

The success of the SPLM encouraged the Darfurians to see armed struggle as a more viable way of achieving economic and political gains. Consequently, in early 2003, two armed militia groups, the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) emerged to begin armed struggle against the Government. A splinter group later broke away from JEM to form a third group known as the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD).

These groups commenced attacks on military and police installations and government convoys especially in Golo in Jebel Marra area. In April 2003, the SLA attacked El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur and the towns of Kutum and Mellit also in North Darfur. The Government promptly responded by launching offensives including aerial bombardments against the SLM/A. The Government also armed the Janjaweed/Arab militia to fight the rebel groups who are non-Arabs. The conflict escalated as every party mobilized and intensified efforts in order to achieve its aim.
THE PARTIES, INTENTIONS AND CHARACTER OF THE CONFLICT

The parties at the beginning of the conflicts are the SLM/A, JEM, NMRD and the Government of Sudan. All these Parties have different intentions which drive their interests in the ongoing conflict.

a. SLM. The intention of the SLM is to create a unified and secular democratic Darfur on the basis of equality, devolution of power, even development and moral and material prosperity for all Darfurians. The SLM became plagued by discordant tunes both along political lines and along the divide between its Zaghawa and Fur/Masalit tribes which resulted in its splitting into the SLM/A (Minni) and SLM/A (Wahid) factions. Consequently, it lost its common political direction and weakened its once unified military command.

b. JEM. The intention of the JEM is to fight against the long-term marginalization of Darfur and for an autonomous state participating in power sharing and enjoying equitable allocation of resources and wealth within a unified Sudan. JEM has the least military capability of all the parties to the conflict and its forces are the least active. They sometimes operated along side any of the factions of the SLM/A depending on the tribal inclination of the fighters.

c. NMRD. The NMRD is not a recognized faction but it deserves attention because of the serious atrocities it carried out in the general area of El Genaina and Tine where they were relatively dominant. The NMRD shares the same intention as JEM. Indeed the movement was the product of a personal dispute in September 2004 between head of JEM, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and Gibril Barey a founder of NMRD whose members are Toundebai, a sub clan of the Zaghawa. They accused JEM of being a radical Islamic fundamentalist movement which not only had ties with Turabi but was also
exploiting religion for political ends which exacerbated the Darfur crisis. The group signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government on the 17 December 2004.

GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN/JANJAWEED
The intention of the Government is to dislodge the rebel groups from the areas they occupy and pacify populations which are sympathetic to their cause in order to reassert government authority and control over all the territory of Darfur. However, in order to avoid international condemnation, the campaign to dislodge the rebels is spearheaded by the Government's S proxies, the JANJAWEED, whose intention is assessed to be to protect the property, honour and religion of the Arab people of Darfur and to support the government to frustrate the intentions of SLM, JEM and NMRD.

e. Other Armed Groups. Minor splinter groups which are not subject to any political control also appeared on the scene resulting in disconnect between the fighters and any political leadership. These groups include stray members of known groups who conduct their own independent operations as armed bandits. The Chadian dissidents are another category of this group who conduct their operations for survival since they have no regular means of livelihood. Generally, these groups are responsible for a lot of the robbery, banditry and hijacking activities taking place in Darfur.

CHARACTER AND DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT
The multiplicity of parties with different intentions has imbued the conflict in Darfur with a complex character. It is certainly a cocktail of conflicts because the features of the conflict are both intra and inter-factional. All the factions are fighting each other. The Government is fighting the 3 major groups. The
Janjaweed, who are regarded as proxies of the GoS, are fighting all parties except the GoS. The JEM and NMRD are each fighting everybody and themselves. The SLM is fighting the GoS, JEM, and NMRD and is also enmeshed in intra-party fighting between the Wahid and the Minni Minawi factions. Also, the rebel insurrection in Chad adds a different dimension to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. There are daily reports of the activities of Chadian deserters operating within the region. It is easy to see that this is a situation of wars without boundaries and without any clearly defined battlefields. Added to all these is the wide spread cases of banditry.

In the midst of all these, the Janjaweed continues to carry out atrocities against innocent civilians, burning villages, and looting, raping and killing innocent civilians especially in the general areas of the South Darfur. These attacks resulted in mass displacements of the population and a humanitarian crisis of great magnitude. The United States of America refer to what was happening in Darfur as genocide. This label sharply focused the attention of the international community on the conflict.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT

With the attention of the world now drawn to the humanitarian disaster in Darfur, the international community started initiating efforts geared towards finding a peaceful solution to the crisis. These initiatives were aimed at creating an enabling environment for the free movement of humanitarian aid to the suffering people of Darfur, especially those displaced to IDP Camps.

The efforts of the international community resulted in 2 major agreements; namely the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and the Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement. These
agreements especially provide the legal basis for the presence of the AU Mission in Sudan and deserve to be discussed.

N'DJAMENA HUMANITARIAN CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

The main thrust of the HCFA was to enhance the security situation by accepting a humanitarian ceasefire and to facilitate the safe passage and distribution of relief materials to the thousands of displaced people who were living in camps scattered all over Darfur. In order to ensure compliance with the ceasefire, the Agreement provided for the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) which includes Parties to the conflict, the AU, Chadian Mediators and the International Community. The job of the Commission is to investigate all reported violations and determine whether a violation has taken place, which party is responsible for such violation and issue a public statement. The Agreement also provided for military observers to facilitate the work of the Commission.

MILITARY OBSERVATION MISSION IN DARFUR

The Mission as given by the mandate of the AU PSC requires AMIS to:

a. Provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and return of IDPs to their home.

b. Monitor and observe the compliance of humanitarian ceasefire agreement; and

C. Assist in the process of confidence building.

THREATS AND RISKS FROM MILITIA FORCES INCLUDING NATURE OF INCIDENCE TAKING PLACE

The parties did not show much respect for the HCFA which they signed and violated it with impunity. It became worst two
months to the signing of the DPA when Darfur witnessed large scale escalation in violence and ceasefire violations as parties to the conflict, especially the Movements, battled each other for territory which they believed would confer advantage on them at the then on-going Abuja negotiations. Apart from the Government and the Janjaweed between whom no clashes were observed, there was a complex state of hostilities between all other elements.

The Janjaweed continued to waste the country side by burning and looting villages whose inhabitants were suspected to oppose the government. The situation was compounded by intra factional fighting especially between SLM (Minni) and SLM (Wahid) factions. Most of these armed activities took place within what could conveniently be mapped into 3 significant zones of armed activities. These were the Shearia-Haskanita-Graida Triangle, Kutum-Tawilla-Jabel Mara Corridor and the Sudan-Chad Border.

Non parties, which include AMIS, were not spared from these hostilities. AMIS facilities such as MGS Graida were attacked and casualties recorded by the peacekeepers. The period witnessed several attacks on NGOs which often resulted in the hijack of vehicles as well as abductions and killings of personnel’s of NGOs. This situation heightened insecurity and resulted in mass killings and the generation of several thousands IDPs, disruption of humanitarian assistance, increased banditry and general dislocation of an already fractured social life. This caused the rebels to agitate for a UN takeover of the peace mission while the Government was against it. There were demonstrations in both camps for and against UN takeover. This trend continued till the signing of the Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

The DPA which was signed in Abuja covers Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final Security Arrangements, the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, as well
as the Implementation Mechanisms. The main area of concern for
the Military Component of AMIS is Chapter 3 of the Agreement.
The chapter is divided into 2 major parts; the Comprehensive
Ceasefire and Final Security Arrangements. The first part deals with
the general principles, the purpose, prohibited activities,
strengthening the ceasefire and verification mechanism, protecting
IDPs and humanitarian supply routes, disengagement, redeployment
and limited arms control, as well as non-military logistics supply to
movements. The second part which deals with the final Security
Arrangements covers integration, disarmament, demobilisation,
social and economic integration, as well as the reform of selected
national security institutions.

The signing of the DPA on 5 May 2006, no doubt, was
significant in the quest for peace in Darfur. However, we must also
acknowledge that, the fact that only half of the parties to the conflict
signed the agreement, is equally significant with significant
consequences. It altered the dynamics of the conflict with switches of
loyalties that undermined cohesion within parties resulting in the
formation of new movements, the G19 and the National Redemption
Front (NRF) which is a coalition of the JEM and Chadian rebels. Also
the work of the CFC became very difficult because it was impossible
for all parties to agree on which agreement, the HCFA or DPA, is to
apply in reviewing situations, and also 'what now constitutes a
violation and who now is a violator'.

I found myself grappling with the complexities of the rejection
of the old HCFA and the non acceptance of the new DPA. Indeed, 3
days after the signing of the DPA, there were massive demonstrations
especially in the SLM/A (Wahid) areas of control. As usual
Organisations and agencies within Darfur, including AMIS, were not
spared from the violence.
In the midst of all these problems, the Government of Sudan decided that the solution to the crisis is on the battlefield and poured in thousands of troops with main battle tanks into Darfur. Since July, the Government has been conducting massive offensives supported by airpower in all the 3 states of Darfur against the newly formed G19 and the National Redemption Front (NRF) who are not signatories to the DPA and their collaborators from amongst Chadian rebels. The signatories to the DPA were not left out either as they jostled for territory especially around Korma, Birmazzah and Tawilla. So, the security situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate since the signing of the DPA in May 2006.

The effect of this insecurity showed in the persistent hostility towards AMIS such as denial of access, and attacks by forces of some parties on AMIS personnel and property which remains a big source of concern not only to AMIS but also to the international community. For instance, on the 26 May 2006, an AU patrol was ambushed at Masteri killing one soldier and seriously wounding 2 others. Thereafter, the Masteri Camp was attacked on 27 May 2006 by unknown armed men who fired rocket propelled grenades into the camp which injured one Milob and 2 PF soldiers. On 10 July 2006 an AMIS convoy escorting 2 PAE fuel tankers to Anabegi was attacked by armed members of the newly formed NRF. On 21 July 06, AMIS troops were attacked at Kassab IDP camp near Kutum.

As formal hostilities continued, informal violence in the form banditry activities was on the increase across the length and breadth of Darfur perpetrated by armed elements most of whom are not signatories to the DPA. These acts of violence affected everybody in Darfur – AMIS, NGOs and civilians. Cases of abducting and killing of AMIS personnel and stealing of AMIS vehicles is now more rampant. Animal rustling, rape and harassment of civilians including
IDPs also continued. Since the signing of the DPA more than 160 violations were recorded between May and September 2006.

Since last year these violations have continued with the most recent being an attack on Milob Group Site at Haskanita which killed 7 Nigerian soldiers and wounded several others.

**PEACE EFFORTS AFTER THE DPA**

All these acts of violence result from noncompliance with the articles of the DPA and the consequent non implementation of its provisions. Other efforts have therefore been going on to secure peace for the region. In the field, inside Darfur itself, AMIS continuously engages the parties on how to achieve peace. The African Union acting with international partners maintain constant dialogue with the various leaders of the parties. The latest major move for peace is the Libyan peace talks which the rebel movements failed to attend despite the Government unilateral declaration of a ceasefire. The talks have now been postponed to give more to the rebels. The question to ask is—will the talks hold? This will depend on several factors of which the current relationship between the Government and the SPLM is a very important one as it will determine the credibility of the Sudan Government. It is possible that that the Government wants to use the talks to buy time before resuming its quest for military solution.

**CONSTRAINTS TO THE PEACE KEEPING EFFORTS**

The constraints to the mission include:

a. Inadequate capacity of the AU to mount a PSO (inadequate strategic direction and support).

b. Misconception of troops of the risks of PSO.

c. Poor attitude of troops to risk situation.

d. Undue focus on mandate of mission by tactical level officers and troops.
e. Failure of the signatories to abide by the HCFA of 8 April 04 and failure of all the Parties to sign the DPA.

f. Lack of political will on the part of government to check the activities of the Janjaweed.

g. Limitations of AMIS mandate which does not provide for monitoring proliferation of arms and rebel groups across the border.

h. Restriction on movement by curfew and early closure of airport.

i. Mushrooming of splinter groups not signatories to the HCFA.

j. Disconnect between political authority and Military commanders.

k. Perfidious actions by the Government of Sudan

l. Lack of vital operation equipment such as heavy Calibre weapons.

m. Lack of good roads and re-supply routes.

n. Inadequate Air asset for operations and logistics.

o. Lack of combat helicopters.

p. Lack of night vision devices, inadequate transport, long range communication and intelligent/surveillance equipment.

q. Inadequate troops.

r. Effect of the rebel incursion in Chad.

s. Hostilities towards AMIS troops and facilities.

t. Lack of reserves.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF AMIS

The CONOPs which I have mentioned is yet to be implemented. AMIS therefore continues to operate an observer mission and by nature of the disposition of the observer mission finds it extremely difficult to cope with the demands of the operation which obviously requires a more flexible and robust approach. Though by all standards, the job of AMIS is a difficult one, the military
component of the African Mission in Sudan gave a good account of itself despite its severe inadequacies. It was able to achieve quite a lot of success in providing secure environment which has contributed to the peace process in Darfur. Specific areas of achievements include:

a. Timely intervention of the AU in Darfur.

b. Willingness of African countries to go along with the AU by contributing troops.

c. The inauguration of new CFC and restructuring of the current verification mechanisms by establishing Sector Ceasefire Sub-Commissions (SCFSC) as well as establishment of CFC Secretariat.

d. Establishment and inauguration of FHQ DPA Implementation Coordination Task Team.

e. Development of Information Operation Strategy (IOS) for the promotion of the DPA through constant interaction with the people, issuing regular press statement on DPA implementation and launching of AMIS Military Component Bulletin *TAMAM*.

f. Establishment of AMIS Logistics Coordination Committee.

g. Liaison with relevant international agencies in Darfur such as those of the UN and NGOs.

h. Distribution of Arabic version of DPA to IDPs and the local population.

i. Constant liaison at all levels with Party leaders and field commanders of signatories to the DPA to discuss the implementation of the DPA. – (4 pix)

j. Meetings with Parties not signatories to the DPA on their position on the DPA and commitment to the HCFA, in order to forestall confusion in the practical implementation of the agreements. (5 pix)
k. Mediating between warring tribes.
l. Recovery of stolen goods and properties (including animals).
m. Assisting in release of prisoners of war including tribesmen abducted by rival tribes.
n. Significantly reduced mass killings.
o. Investigating all ceasefire violations.
p. Assisting in instilling confidence in the populace.
q. Assisting in the protection and evacuation of civilians under imminent threat of danger, within available capability and resources including rescuing of NGOs and UN agencies.
r. In-theatre training of personnel on the DPA and tasks associated with it including capacity building measures in preparation for DDR.
s. Preparation of final map indicating cleared humanitarian routes, Buffer and Demilitarized Zones, parties’ areas of control and nomadic migration routes.
t. Intensified patrolling of buffer zones, demilitarized zones (DMZ) around IDP Camps.
u. De-mining activities in cooperation with the parties, the UN and other agencies.
v. Provided escorts for VIPs and humanitarian convoys where necessary throughout Darfur.
w. Medevac for parties and civil population.
x. Protection of AMIS bases and facilities and logistic supplies.

CONCLUSION
The decision by the Government security forces in Sudan to continue to seek a battlefield solution to the problem of Darfur and the continued operation with impunity of the Janjaweed in the North and South of Darfur means that the general insecurity will continue. The result is that IDPs who recently returned to their homes may not
have the confidence to stay and will return to the camps. This general feeling of insecurity may also continue to hinder the willingness of some people who have weapons to lay them down voluntarily. Therefore, escalation of violence will continue with the attendant suffering of the people of the territory. The refusal of the Sudanese Government to allow a better-equipped organisation to assume the responsibility of facilitating the peace process also means that the suffering in the land will become more desperate as the days progress.

It is accepted that the deployment of AMIS is useful, but the mission’s effectiveness is constrained by all round inadequacies in manpower, equipment, funding and logistics. Though AMIS has, relative to its resources, performed tremendously well, a lot remains to be done if the critical humanitarian situation is to be mitigated. The way forward is for the parties, who are the major stakeholders to the stability of the region, to show commitment to the HCFA, the DPA and any other peace initiatives.

The International Community did a lot in supporting the AU Mission in Darfur. It is hoped that their magnanimity will continue to sustain, not just the humanitarian aid for IDPs, but also the PSO of the AU. I wish to observe that it is very important, if not most important that, the African Union should do all that it takes to acquire the political will necessary to build the capacity to internally provide resources it needs to solve Africa’s problems. If the AU had this capacity, much of the problems would have been reduced and AMIS would have been in a better position to promote security, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and ultimately enhance the process of political settlement necessary for peace and security in the Darfur Region.
with the new AU-UN hybrid force now being set up, it is hoped that massive injects of resources from the UN will adequately address the issue of logistics.

It is my belief that if AMIS is sufficiently resourced and reinforced to adequately dominate the AOR the force will have improved effectiveness in promoting security and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, the preferred solution is contained in the words of Albert Einstein who says "Peace cannot be kept by force; It can only be achieved by understanding".